

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE**

ATTY.'S DOCKET: AKKAR=1

In re Application of:	)	Art Unit: 2137
Mehdi-Laurent AKKAR	)	Examiner: Z. A. Davis
Appln. No.: 09/771,967	)	Washington, D.C.
Filed: January 30, 2001	)	Confirmation No. 2638
For: METHOD OF EXECUTING A	)	
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL	)	
BETWEEN TWO ELECTRONIC...	)	

**DECLARATION OF INVENTORS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 1.131**

Each of the undersigned, Mehdi-Laurent Akkar and Paul Dischamp, is a co-inventor of the above-identified application and we are collectively the inventors of the above-identified application.

We understand that the examiner has applied U.S. Patent No. 6,594,761 to Chow in a rejection of the above-identified patent application.

We hereby declare that the aforementioned patent by Chow is not prior art to our invention, inasmuch as we had actually reduced to practice, and thus made our invention, prior to the June 9, 1999 filing date of Chow.

1. In evidence of such reduction to practice, we attach herewith a copy of a description of the invention and a listing of computer code as Exhibit A, having a date (redacted) which is prior to the June 9, 1999, filing date of Chow.

5. The first page of Exhibit A states as follows:

**Anti-DPA Improvements in S-BOXes:**

Authors: Mehdi-Laurent AKKAR  
Paul DISCHAMP

Date:

REDACTED

**1 - Explanations**

- The 8 S-BOXes are processed randomly, so as to:
  - divide the height of peaks by 8 on the signal;
  - avoid a 1-round attack since it is impossible to know which S-BOX is processed.
- Bitwise inverted DES is carried out randomly (one of the characteristics of DES is that this is possible (see Schneier or Stinson)). For that purpose, a second set of bitwise complemented S-BOXes is used both on input and output, so that any attempt to predict which bits circulate within the component will be erroneous. However, at the final XOR output of each round, the output is once again the appropriate one and has to be re-complemented (in the case of an inverted round). If this is done, at some point, whatever the round (whether it is inverted or not), the message will be available in its "clear" form, so that DPA can then be applied. Therefore, before and after each round, the left part of the message is randomly complemented or not (*in the normal case*: inverse, and then inverse, OR non-inverse, and then non-inverse // *in the inverted case*: inverse, and then non-inverse, OR non-inverse, and then inverse). For this purpose, the following steps are carried out: "XORing" is performed with X, and then with X, when nothing has to be changed, and "XORing" is performed with X and X<sup>-1</sup> (X's complement), thus yielding the inverse. To make this inconspicuous, X is used in such a way that XORing with X and X<sup>-1</sup> consumes the same amount of processing (in this case, 104 and 151). X could also be chosen randomly.
- Finally, in order to avoid an attack against a large number of messages in which the random generator's bias could be used, the difference between the normal/inverted DES is checked.

**The Code of our DES using these countermeasures is as follows:**

6. Exhibit A in its entirety was sent, the day after its creation, by mail to our patent attorney, Mr. J. Barbin, at Cabinet Bonnet-Thirion. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit B to this declaration.

7. Exhibit B states as follows:

Mr J. Barbin  
Cabinet Bonnet-Thirion

12, avenue de la Grande-Armée  
75017 Paris

Re : filing of a Soleau envelope (CSP99010)

Dear Sirs

Please file on our behalf the enclosed six pages in a Soleau envelope in the name of De La Rue Cartes & Systèmes. Thank you in advance and best regards.

D Pottier

8. All of work done in preparation of Exhibit A was done by us or under the direct supervision of at least one of us, and the computer code shown implements the claimed invention.

9. The work reflected in Exhibit A was conducted in France after January 1, 1996, and prior to June 9, 1999.

We hereby declare that all the statements made herein of our own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code and the such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

Date: \_\_October 27th, 2009\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_/ Mehdi-Laurent Akkar/\_\_\_\_\_  
Mehdi-Laurent Akkar

Date: \_\_October 27<sup>th</sup>, 2009\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_/ Paul Dischamp/\_\_\_\_\_  
Paul Dischamp



De la Rue

## Améliorations anti-DPA sur les S-BOX:

Auteurs: Mehdi-Laurent AKKAR  
Paul DISCHAMP

Date: REDACTED

### 1 - Explications

- Les 8 S-BOX sont traitées dans un ordre aléatoire, ce qui permet:
  - de diviser la hauteur des pics par 8 sur le signal.
  - d'éviter une attaque en 1 coup car l'on ne sait pas quelle est la S-BOX traitée.
- De manière aléatoire on effectue le DES de manière inversée bit à bit (une des caractéristique du DES est que c'est possible (cf. Schneier ou Stinson)). Pour cela on utilise un deuxième jeu de S-BOX complémentées bit à bit en entrée et en sortie, ce qui fausse toute prédiction sur les bit circulant dans le composant. Cependant à la sortie du xor final de chaque round: la sortie est à nouveau la bonne et il faut (dans le cas d'un round inversé) la recomplémenter. Si l'on procède ainsi, quel que soit le round (inversé ou non), à un moment le message se retrouve en "clair" et l'on peut alors appliquer un DPA. De ce fait avant et après chaque round on complémente ou non de manière aléatoire la partie gauche du message (*dans le cas normal*: inverse puis inverse, OU non inverse puis non inverse // *dans le cas inversé*: inverse puis non inverse, OU non inverse puis inverse). Pour cela on procède ainsi: on "xore" avec X puis avec X quand on ne veut rien faire et l'on "xore" avec X et  $X^{-1}$  (complément de X) ce qui donne l'inverse. Pour que ce ne soit pas visible on utilise X tel que le xor avec X et  $X^{-1}$  consomme autant (dans ce cas 104 et 151). On pourrait également utiliser X tiré aléatoirement.
- Enfin afin d'éviter une attaque sur un grand nombre de messages où le biais du générateur aléatoire pourrait être utilisé, on contrôle la différence de DES effectué normal/ inversé.

### Le Code de notre DES utilisant ces contre-mesures est:

```

EXTRN DATA (overdes,over) : 7 bytes for the buffer
EXTRN DATA (inplace) : 8 bytes for the message
EXTRN DATA (buffer) : 8 bytes for a buffer
EXTRN DATA (choice) : 1 byte for a counter
EXTRN DATA (choice) : 1 byte for a counter
EXTRN DATA (DES_permut) : 1 byte for the permutation
EXTRN DATA (perm) : 8 bytes for the permutation table

```

```

.....
: DES 32bits randomises avec anti-DPA (SP et DP)
: valeur de voir (104/151)
.....

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decrypt

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CALL 0FF604
MOV _ipex,40104

```

EXHIBIT A





De La Rue

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SPR 401 1 200 00000

```

06_CND:      LRC A
              MOV C.BIT14
              RRC A
              RR      A
              ORL     A,imode1
              MOV imode1,A
              JMP PCI_Leap

06_LDN:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT11
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT1
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT5
              RRC A
              JMP B0_END

01_MSH:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT13
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT18
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT3
              RRC A
              RR      A
              RR      A
              ORL     A,imode1
              MOV imode1,A
              JMP PCI_Leap

01_LDN:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT5
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT21
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT19
              RRC A
              JMP B1_END

01_MSH:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT11
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT19
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT23
              RRC A
              RR      A
              RR      A
              ORL     A,imode1
              MOV imode1,A
              JMP PCI_Leap

01_LDN:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT1
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT25
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT8
              RRC A
              JMP B2_END

01_MSH:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT7
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT7
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT15
              RRC A
              RR      A
              RR      A
              ORL     A,imode1
              MOV imode1,A
              JMP PCI_Leap

01_LDN:      JMP B0_MSH
              JMP B0_LDN
              JMP B1_LDN
              JMP B2_MSH
              JMP B2_LDN
              JMP B3_MSH
              JMP B3_LDN
              JMP B4_MSH
              JMP B4_LDN
              JMP B5_MSH
              JMP B5_LDN
              JMP B6_MSH
              JMP B6_LDN
              JMP B7_MSH
              JMP B7_LDN

01_LSR:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT30
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT13
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT2
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT4
              RRC A
              JMP B3_END

04_MSH:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT71
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT32
              RRC A
              MOV C.BIT41
              RRC A
              RR      A
              RR      A
              ORL     A,imode1
              MOV imode1,A
              JMP PCI_Leap

04_LDN:      CLR A
              MOV C.BIT77

```

## DE LA RUE CARD SYSTEMS



De Laflamme

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SP SUBROUTINE  
Input INPDES 0—7  
Output OUPDES 0—7

[illegible]

: CN nrm outre Short (au) A. 4000011111









DeLaRue

Paris, REDACTED

De:

D. POTTIER

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**DE LA RUE CARD SYSTEMS**

3-5, avenue Gallieni  
94250 GENTILLY - France

à:

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**Cabinet Bonnet-Thirion**  
**12 avenue de la Grande Armée**  
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<http://www.delarue.com>

Votre Ref.

Notre Ref. DLRCS/DP/DEV/dp/99108

Objet: Dépôt d'une enveloppe Soleau (CSP 99010)

Monsieur,

Je vous prie de bien vouloir déposer pour nous les **six feuilles** jointes dans une enveloppe Soleau au nom de De La Rue Cartes & Systèmes.

Vous en remerciant d'avance, je vous prie de croire, Monsieur, à l'assurance de mes sentiments distingués.

D. Pottier

**EXHIBIT B**